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FOREWORD 
This research work aims to contribute to the advancement of educational literature and 
training materials on cost benefit analysis in the context of venture capital investment 
decision when evaluating potential investments. It reveals the use of different valuation 
methods by venture capitalist and how cost benefit analysis (CBA) could be used as a 
valuation technique. The study shows that venture capital firms seldom use CBA when 
evaluating potential investment in Norway.  However, the use of CBA can provide significant 
pay-backs by improving the quality of returns and enhancing financial decisions that 
minimize the potential risk of loss if venture capitalist strictly adhered to it before negotiating 
the deal. 
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ABSTRACT 
This research work focuses on the differences in the approaches and methods used by venture 
capital firms to evaluate potential investment. This includes: due diligence, sources of 
information in preparing valuations and the valuation methods used. Then how cost-benefit 
analysis could be used in such investment in Norway is further explored. The study aims to 
describe the cost-benefit analysis process by which venture capital firms operating in Norway 
use to evaluate funds to minimize the loss of capital invested and enhance a good return on 
investment.  The dissertation is based on a 2-staged questionnaire survey process with venture 
capitalists operating in Norway. In the first phase of the study, fifteen (15) venture capitalist 
firms participated in a telephone interview followed by a set of questionnaires via email 
aimed at discussing the differences in the approaches and methods used in evaluating 
potential investment. In the second phase of the study, five (5) venture capital firms gave 
insight into the role of cost-benefit analysis in the investment decision processes. The 
questionnaire survey reveals that a relatively high proportion of Norwegian venture capital 
firms place special importance on the curriculum vitae of management and interview with 
entrepreneurs, in evaluating their potential investments. At the same time, they use the 
payback period and capitalized maintainable earning (P/E multiples) as the valuation method 
and not cost-benefit analysis. However, it seems that venture capital firms who performed 
cost-benefit analysis used the internal rate of return as a measure of the discount rate and the 
determination of the discount rate is the most important factor taking into consideration 
systematic and non-systematic risk. The discount rate used by Norwegian venture capitalists 
is more intuitive and have about the same interval as in the rest of the world depending on the 
company stage. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND STATEMENT 
 
Venture capitalists have played an important role in fostering the new technology based firms, 
many of which have become today’s large businesses such as Google, Apple and Intel 
(Florida and Kenney, 1988). VC firms basically raise money from both institutions and 
individuals for the investment in high-risk, high-return unlisted firms. They also play a part in 
investment selection by acting both as ‘‘scouts’’ able to identify future potentials and as 
‘‘coaches’’ who can help realize them (Baum and Silverman, 2004).  
 
Determining the economic valuation of a company is one of the more challenging and 
important discussions an entrepreneur can have with investors (Quindlen 2000). Research that 
provides operational guidance on such economic valuation, is, however, lacking. Indeed, 
Wright and Robbie (1998:558) conclude that: “little work is available on the valuation of 
venture capital investments”. Furthermore, some venture capitalists maintain that: “the truth 
about valuing a start-up is that it’s often a guess” (May and Simmons, 2001:129). Wright and 
Robbie (1998) point out that most venture capital investments typically have large amounts of 
private information. The research reported in this paper seeks a better understanding of the 
information sources used and the valuation methods applied by venture capitalists in the face 
of this information deficit. Importantly we explore how venture capitalist can use cost-benefit 
analysis as a valuation tool to evaluate potential investments.  
 
Venture capital firms can be seen as seeking a return on their specific and distinctive skills in 
identifying, investing in and monitoring new projects and risky projects in established firms. 
Barry (1994) argues that intensive screening and evaluation allows the venture capital firms to 
gather substantial amounts of information prior to investing, reducing the extent of any 
adverse selection among projects. Venture capitalists are agents for providers of funds. If they 
do not perform satisfactorily then they may fail to attract further funding. There is thus 
pressure on venture capital firms to use a wide range of accounting and non-accounting 
information. This involves the process of due diligence, such as verifying the robustness of 
accounting information, particularly profit and cash flow forecasts (Wright and Robbie, 1998) 
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and acquiring other information for valuation purposes. A variety of valuation techniques and 
adjustments to expected rates of return can be used and this includes cost-benefit analysis. 
 
1.2. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
 
What are the key factors that influence the economic value of an entrepreneurial firm when 
such a firm seeks equity financing from a venture capitalist, what valuation tools are used and 
how can CBA be used in light of these other valuation tools? If we are to know whether the 
venture capital market allocates resources properly, we need to understand how VCs make 
investment decisions yet, how to place an economic value on a new venture is still one of the 
most difficult tasks in venture capital decision-making (Mechner, 1989). In this study, I show 
valuation methods used and the importance of venture capitalists weighing the costs and 
benefits that a CBA reveals and whether, in the light of their objectives, an investment option 
is worth pursuing given both its costs and benefits.  
 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
The main research problems that are discussed in this research work can be stated as follows:  
 “How do VC firms evaluate their potential investments?” and “what is cost benefit analysis 
as a valuation tool in the context of venture capital investment decision?” This is with 
emphasis on Norwegian firms. 
 
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
 
The outcome of this study will enable us to review literature regarding how venture capitalists 
can effectively use cost-benefit analysis in their investment and financing decision to 
determine whether a particular investment decision is economically feasible and which of two 
or more investee companies when invested in provides the best return on capital invested. 
The findings of this paper could also serve as a good source of reference for interested 
researchers, practioners and investors. 
 
1.5 LIMITATION OF THE STUDY 
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The non-co-operation and lack of interest from majority of the venture capital firms made it 
difficult to have a fair representation of opinion from all the primary venture capital firms in 
Norway and makes our findings statistically insignificant because of the relatively small 
sample size. This limited our scope of work and our ability to acquire an in depth information 
as much as possible from a more practical source to be representative of the Norwegian 
venture capital market. 
 
1.6 ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY 
 
  This research work is organized into five main chapters. The first chapter covers 
Introduction and deals with background information, a statement of the problem, the 
objectives of this study as well as the outline of the Study. In chapter two, the relevant 
literature is reviewed on cost-benefit analysis. It provides a literature review on the steps to an 
effective cost-benefit analysis and a discussion of the conceptual framework of CBA in 
venture capital investment decision making. The review gives a theoretical framework on the 
study.  Chapter 3 reviews venture capital investment decisions and discusses the pre and post 
investment decisions used by most venture capital companies. Chapter four will describe the 
methodology of the analysis i.e. the data and sample characteristics of Norwegian VC firm 
survey conducted in this paper are described. In Chapter 5, the empirical results are presented 
and my evidence and some implication discussions are summarized in Chapter six. 
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In this section, literature on cost-benefit analysis is reviewed and provides insight and 
validation for an analysis of venture capitalist using this analysis as a valuation tool. 
 
2.2 COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
 
Prest and Turvey (1965) explains cost-benefit analysis as a practical way of assessing the 
desirability of projects, where it is important to take a long view (in the sense of looking at 
repercussions in the further, as well as in the nearer, future) and a wide view (in the sense of 
allowing for side-effects of many kinds on many persons, industries, regions, etc.), i.e. it 
implies the enumeration and evaluation of all the relevant costs and benefits (Prest and 
Turvey, 1965). The Financial Services and Market Act (FSMA) define CBA this way:  “Cost-
benefit analysis means an estimate of the costs together with an analysis of the benefits…” In 
other words, FSMA requires at a minimum that CBA be a quantification of the costs and a 
qualitative analysis of the benefits in a form of return in capital invested to the venture 
capitalist for example. 
 
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) in my opinion is a powerful tool which aids in assisting a 
decision making process in that it follows economic principles that resources are scarce and 
they should be utilized wisely to increase net welfare. Cost-benefit analysis increases 
efficiency through the effective allocation of scarce resources. The quantification of costs and 
benefits is one of CBA’s strength. However, it is also a weakness in that, there is the problem 
regarding the quantification of all the cost and benefit for a particular investment project. The 
weighing is judged on preferences and these preferences can differ among groups Thus, I 
"Of all the techniques of investment appraisal which in recent years have come to be 
applied to investment projects, none has attracted more attention than cost-benefit 
analysis". (Blaug, 1 970). 
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think that judging something based on preference is not credible. Also there is the difficulty in 
quantifying intangible benefits and cost. This problem is conceivable in that most researchers 
(e.g. Fuguitt and Wilcox, 1999) advise the qualitative analysis of any cost and benefit which 
cannot be quantified in numerical terms. 
Another weakness is the fact that costs can be overstated. It can come from the way the costs 
are estimated, the size of the projects or action needed, and the cost factors (i.e. to include 
costs that are irrelevant to the project). Empirically, the costs and benefits can be overstated. 
As it can be overstated, it means that inaccuracies happened and thus CBA’s result should be 
treated with caution (Flyvbjerg et al., 2005). Also CBA deals only with optimal allocation of 
scarce resources, yet it does not take into account distribution problems. For example consider 
two potential investments which provide different returns to the venture capitalist; after 
conducting a CBA, the VC selects the project investment which gives him a superior return 
on capital invested or positive NPV within the shortest possible time regardless of other 
factors. 
 
2.3 HOW VENTURE CAPITALIST CAN USE CBA TO EVALUATE POTENTIAL 
INVESTMENT. 
 
In conducting a cost-benefit analysis, venture capital firms must follow the methodology in 
enumerating and evaluating all the relevant cost and benefits. Galambos and Schreiber (1978) 
have identified four steps for a successful cost-benefit analysis. These steps are: ‘identifying 
the cost and benefits of the project, measuring the costs and benefits in dollars, considering 
the costs and benefits over the life of the project and finally, reaching a decision’ Galambos 
and Schreiber (1978, 62-63). 
 
2.3.1 IDENTIFYING THE COST AND BENEFITS 
 
Cost of venture capital 
 
Most venture capital funds are structured as limited partnerships. These partnerships generally 
have two types of investors: Limited partners and a general partner. The investors in the fund 
are called limited partners (LP) many of whom are pension funds, corporations and high net 
worth investors. The venture capital team is called the general partner (GP). The GP finds the 
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investments, negotiates the deal, monitors the investment (hopefully adding value along the 
way), exits the investment and returns the proceeds to the LPS. These funds usually have an 
active life of ten years (Black& Ronald, 1998).  
 
The venture capitalist incurs cost in proceeding to negotiate the deal. Some of the direct costs 
for the purpose of this research identified by most VC include: the startup cost which happens 
to be one of the components of the total financing cost. Maintenance cost comprising 
management fees, carried interest and other expenses are part of other direct cost the VC 
should identify. Regarding management fees, Partners and staff of a venture capital receive 
about 2% of the total amount of the fund they manage each year. Implying that over the ten 
year life span of the fund, the general partners receive 20% of the total fund. For example, if 
the fund had total commitment of 100million dollars and a 2% management fee, the fund 
would pay the management company 2million per year which is expected to cover the 
operating cost of the management company including investment personnel salaries, office 
expenses, travelling expenses and all other expenses related to managing the business 
(Berkery, 2007).  
 
With Carried interest, the VC firm managing a fund generally will be allocated 20% carried 
interest in the fund. This means that the firm is entitled to 20% of all the gains, once the LPs 
have received 100% of the capital of the fund (Berkery, 2007).  The general idea is that if the 
fund is profitable, the general partner will receive a reward. For example, if a fund was able to 
pay $200 million in distributions to investors who contributed $100 million, 20% of the $100 
million gain ($200 million in distributions - $100 million in contributions) or $20 million 
would go to the general partner. This is a form of motivation to the general partners but 
inflates the operating cost. Expenses incurred that clearly relate to specific investments are 
charged against the fund and not from the 2% management fee. These other expenses include 
due diligence expenses, legal Fees, organizational and Syndication Costs, audit and tax fees 
among others (Berkery, 2007). 
 
The other cost is indirect financing cost which is associated with the various expenses that a 
firm incurs to obtain the funding. These costs invariably increase the total financing cost and 
decrease the financing amount. However, these indirect costs are not easy to estimate 
(Carpentier & Suret, 2005). According to Timmons & Spinelli (2004) entrepreneurs grossly 
tend to underestimate the real cost of getting the cash into the bank and also underestimate 
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real time, effort and creative energy required. The degree of effort fund raising requires is 
perhaps the least appreciated aspect in obtaining capital. In both cases, there are opportunity 
costs in expending these resources in a particular direction when both time and calendar are 
moving. 
 
Carpentier & Suret (2005) identify 4 non-independent elements that collectively generate high 
indirect cost of financing that VC must inculcate into their cost assessment. They include risk, 
size, information asymmetry and market structures. Young companies with the desire to grow 
are characterized by high risk. According to Stromberg and Kaplan (2003), VC are faced with 
three types of uncertainty when considering the cost of a potential investment ‘internal 
uncertainty - the relevant information is internal to the firm and it is more likely that the VC is 
less informed than the entrepreneur; external uncertainty - the relevant information is external 
to the firm and it is more likely that the VC and the entrepreneur are equally informed; and 
difficulty of execution, different from both previous notions of risk, which captures the 
complexity of the task and the reliance on the entrepreneur's human capital’ (Stromberg and 
Kaplan, 2003). According to Berkery (2007), if an investee company performs more poorly 
than expected, the fund manager writes down the valuation of the investment to signal the LP 
that money has been impaired written in the form of 25%, 50% , 75% or 100% is often used.   
Poor investments are apparent after 6 to 12months but good investment take quite some time 
(Berkery, 2007). However, in Europe there are guidelines for portfolio firm valuation from 
EVCA (European private equity and venture capital association) Regarding size, small 
investment made at an early stage represent an additional risk and cost and comprise only a 
minimal proportion of their operations borne by these VC firms (Murray, 1999). Information 
asymmetry exists in most small companies, where key information is not easily assessable to 
external stakeholders (Denis, 2003). Bollingtof et al., (2003) note that asymmetry generates 
agency cost that is suboptimal behavior by management to the detrimental of shareholders. 
Efforts to control asymmetry and agency problems only increase cost (Cressy & Olofson, 
1997). In a competitive market, capital suppliers tend to reduce cost and negotiating times to 
attract the best projects. If a company lacks real alternatives, it may incur significant 
additional cost because capital providers hold discretionary power which may unduly prolong 
the financing time (Carpentier & Suret, 2005). Other recurring cost VC must be on the 
lookout for when negotiating the deal among others include: File preparation cost which is the 
effort of complying with standards in terms of internal and accounting practices. The cost of 
searching for investors, cost involved in the due diligence procedure, cost involved in the 
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protection of intellectual property rights, the cost of negotiation and conclusion of financing 
conditions and the cost of reorganization and use of funds (Carpentier & Suret, 2005). 
 
Benefits of venture capital 
 
Before making an investment and designing the financial contracts, VCs spend a significant 
amount of time and effort evaluating and screening the benefits in undertaking a given 
investment. VCs explicitly consider the attractiveness of the external environment -- the 
market size, customer adoption, and competition - the feasibility of the strategy and 
technology, the quality of the management team, and the deal terms (Stromberg and Kaplan, 
2003).  According to National Venture Capital Association in America, the venture capitalist 
only realizes a return on their investment if the company goes public (IPO) or is merged or 
purchased by another company (M&A). Venture Economics (2000) reports a 25.2% 5 year 
return and 18.7% 10 year return for all venture capital funds in their data base as of 12/21/99, 
a period with much higher stock returns. This calculation uses year-end values reported by the 
funds themselves. Chen et al. (2002) examine the 148 venture capital funds in the Venture 
Economics data that had liquidated as of 1999. In these funds they find an annual arithmetic 
average return of 45%, an annual compound (log) average return of 13.4%, and a standard 
deviation of 115.6%.  As a result of the large volatility, however, they calculate that one 
should only allocate 9% of a portfolio to venture capital. Kaplan and Schoar (2003) find that 
average fund returns are about the same as the S&P500 return. They find that fund returns are 
surprisingly persistent over time. To understand the venture fund returns, the researcher uses a 
model from Wilson (2008) who provides some real numbers in his model (Table 1). 
 
Assumptions:      
Fund size 100,000,000     
Term 10 Years    
Management 
fee: 
2.50% In first 4 years    
 2.25% In year 5    
 2.00% In year 6    
 1.75% In year 7    
 1.5% In year 8,9&10    
Table 1: Venture Fund Cost and Returns 
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Carry 20% of gains net of  
management fees 
   
Average initial 
investment 
2,088,235 1mm concept,2.5m 
trial,3.5 revenue 
   
Average 
follow on 
investment 
2,500,0000 For concept stage 
and trial stage 
investment 
   
 3,500,000 For revenue stage 
investment 
   
Average total 
investment 
5,300,000 Per deal    
Total deals 15     
Initial 
investment per 
year 
3 Year 1    
 4 Year 2 &3    
 3 Year 4    
 1 Year 5    
Winners 5 33%    
Money backs 5 33%    
Losers 5 33%    
Rounds per 
investment: 
1 For loser    
 2 For money back    
 3 For winner    
 4 For concept stage 
winner 
 
 
 
 4 Concept 2 losers 1 money 
back 
1 winner 
Deals by 
stage: 
7 Trial 2 losers 2 money 
back 
3 winners 
 4 Revenue 1 loser 2 money 
back 
1 winner 
Average 
return 
multiple: 
- For loser    
 1.25 For money back     
 6.5 For winner     
Average 
Holding 
period(years) 
6 Concept    
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 5 Trial    
 4 Revenue    
 2 Loser    
 
From the model $100mm venture fund model produces the following; Total Management 
Fees: $20mm-this is debatable in that management fees are most commonly calculated from 
net committed capital. That means that when exits have been made and the money has been 
returned to the investor, management fee drops as committed capital drops ; Total Invested 
Dollars: $80mm; Total Proceeds on Investments: $322mm; Total Gain on Investments: 
$242mm; Gross Multiple: 4x ($322mm/$80mm); Gross IRR: 39.2%; Multiple including 
Management Fees: 3.2x; Gain Including Management Fees: $222mm; IRR Including 
Management Fees: 32.9%; Carried Interest Fees: $44mm (20% of $222mm); NET Multiple: 
2.56x; Net IRR: 28.6%. 
It is clear from the above model and its assumptions that, if a venture capitalist invest $100M 
fund, management fees can take $20M off the top, so there is only $80M left to invest. That 
2% annual management fee over the 10 year life of a fund really adds up. Also note that if the 
fund returns 4X on invested capital (4 X $80M = $320M) that the VC gets 20% of the NET 
profit above a predefined yearly hurdle rate. 
According to (Wilson, 2008), the average investment in the fund from the model is $5.3mm. 
If the fund invested that much in one company over a number of years and owns 20% of the 
business and the business is sold for $500mm, then the fund's 20% is worth $100mm. It's a 
20x multiple on the investment. This is mostly rare but it happens in the venture capital 
business. When the $100mm is distributed, one deal has returned the entire fund. That is huge 
because then the other winners will typically collectively return from one times the fund's 
value to three times the fund's value. After carried interest fees, that gets you to the 1.5x to 3x 
net to Limited Partners. 
Berkery (2007) explains that, a fund that gives back three or more times the capital committed 
is viewed as having done very well. Two and a half times would be considered good. 
Anything under two would be considered disappointing. Venture capital investors generally 
say that they will invest in a company only where they can see a way to earning a 10 times or 
higher multiple on investment (Berkery, 2007). According to Berkery (2007), empirical 
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evidence on fund return shows that big hits are the difference between the highest performing 
venture capital firms and average ones i.e.  A big hit repays one-third, one-half, all or even a 
multiple of the fund. 
 
Furthermore, as control issues are very important in venture capital financing, financial 
contracts between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs include detailed descriptions of how 
control rights are divided. Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) found that in VC financings cash 
flow rights, board rights, voting rights, liquidation rights, and other control rights are 
separately allocated and that allocation of control rights between VC and entrepreneur is a 
central feature of the financial contract. These rights are often contingent on observable 
measures of financial and non-financial performance (Ibid). A benefit of such venture capital 
financing is that control rights received by venture capitalists are usually disproportionately 
large to what they would get under the “one share one vote rule” (Sahlman, 1990).  Gompers 
(1997) found that the control rights received by venture capitalists are greater when the 
problem of asymmetric information is larger (Kirilenko, 2001). 
 
2.3.2 MEASURING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS 
 
Once the venture capitalists’ benefits and costs have been identified, the second step is to 
measure or assign a dollar amount to each benefit and cost. The indirect cost and benefit 
identified by most VC cannot be measured based on financial statements which incidentally 
are not available in the case of private companies. A dollar amount can nonetheless be 
assigned to tangible benefits and costs (Carpentier & Suret, 2005). 
 
Many scholars argue that flaws of cost-benefit analysis occur during the measurement of costs 
and benefits. Too often analysts will leave out or incorrectly measure costs and benefits. 
Often there will be benefit and cost variables that are difficult to measure in market value. 
These are referred to as intangibles. Fuguitt and Wilcox (1999) have three principles for 
measuring intangible variables: ‘When a policy has hard-to-measure effects, the analyst 
should (1) value as many benefits and costs as possible using monetary units; (2) if unable to 
assign a monetary value to a particular policy consequence, try to quantify it in physical units; 
and (3) in the especially difficult situation where the consequence eludes quantification of any 
kind, identify and describe it qualitatively’ (Fuguitt & Wilcox 1999, 173). 
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When performing a cost-benefit analysis using unmeasured variables, the venture capitalist 
can estimate a threshold. “Intuitively, the decision maker can weigh the unmeasured benefits 
and consider whether or not these exceed the threshold” (Fuguitt & Wilcox 1999, 173).  
 
2.3.3 CONSIDERING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OVER THE LIFE OF THE 
PROJECT 
 
Venture capital funds are created for a fixed term, typically ten years. They are formed as 
limited partnerships. The venture capital firm serves as the general partner and wealthy 
Individuals, families and university endowments are the limited partners. The funds invest 
in entrepreneurial companies and distribute returns to their limited partners as they harvest 
their investments (Berkery, 2007). The managers of venture capital funds compete with each 
other to obtain funds from investors. Therefore, they are mostly interested in the relative 
performance of the fund - that is, the fund is successful if its performance is better than the 
performance of competitors. The goal of the venture capitalist is to cultivate an investment to 
the point where they can successfully exit the investment with a positive return and of the 
companies that a venture fund is invested in the venture capitalist only expects to take 20 to 
35 percent of these public (Gompers and Lerner, 1999). Of the remaining companies the 
venture capitalist expects to have about 35 percent partial to total loss and the remainder to 
return a zero or small profit (Sahlman, 1990). Going public is not the only means of 
successful exit available to the venture capitalist but recently it has become the most desirable 
and profitable and only a small portion of venture capitalist investments reach a level where 
they can have an initial public offering (IPO) but when they do, they produce some of the 
highest returns (59.5% per year on average as compared to 25% when combined with 
acquisitions) (Gompers, 1995). Other methods of exit are to sell the investment to another 
company, a management buyout for companies that stay private or mainly for failures, 
liquidation. Venture capitalists are given strong incentives through the structure of the 
partnership to try and have every investment exit as successfully as possible (Gompers and 
Lerner 1999). 
 
In case of listed companies, the cost of equity can be determined by using the Capital Assets 
Pricing Model (CAPM) or some other market equilibrium model. The simplicity of CAPM 
has made it a standard benchmark in the industry. According to the CAPM, the required rate 
of return depends on the risk-free rate, the systematic risk of the company (or project) 
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measured by beta, and the market risk premium. In the case of well developed capital 
markets, obtaining that data is not a very difficult task. Although there are some fundamental 
and technical issues associated with the use of CAPM (Damodaran, 2005), it is still by far the 
most widely used model for estimating the cost of equity (Pereiro, 2002). However, in the 
case of venture capital, the use of CAPM is difficult for the following reasons as enumerated 
by Koomagi & Sander (2006) as follows: 
 
• Investments are made to a non-listed company and therefore liquidity risk exists. 
• The unsystematic part of the total risk is much greater due to technological risks. 
• The entrepreneur is sometimes forced to invest most or even all his wealth into one 
project, which makes it difficult to diversify the risks. In that case, he wants 
compensation for the total risk not only for the systematic part of it. Jones and 
Rhodes-Kropf (2004) argued that diversifiable risk should be priced even if the 
investor is fully diversified. 
• The technological uncertainty declines during the project life cycle, i.e. the risk and 
thus the required rate of return depends on the stage of the project. 
• Using staged financing instead of lump sum financing reallocates the risks between 
entrepreneurs and venture capitalists and thus may affect the cost of outside equity. 
• Quite often, the distribution of control and voting rights does not correspond to the 
distribution of cash flow rights. This, however, affects the risk taken by an outside 
investor and his required rate of return. 
 
Historically, the discount rate by which venture capital funds calculate the value of companies 
lies in the range of 20–80% per year, depending on where the company stands in its lifecycle. 
This rate is materially higher than the customary discount rate for equity investments or for 
investments in other traded securities, even if the latter are very risky (Kolle, 2006). These 
discount rates reduce as the firm develops: Seed up: 80%, startup: 50-70%, First stage: 40-
60%, second stage: 30-50%, Bridge/Mezzanine: 20-35%, public expectation: 15-25% 
(Manigart et al., 2002). This is partly because the bigger the company, the smaller is its 
systematic risk since its growth rates are more moderate and its expenses lower in relation to 
the turnover. In addition, the investment becomes more liquid as the company grows and 
succeeds since there are more potential buyers for its stock. Furthermore, as the company 
develops, it hires its own skilled management team and is less dependent on the assistance of 
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venture capitalists. Therefore, the payment for the added value contributed by such investors 
is reduced. In addition, the uncertainty with respect to the company's terminal value also 
decreases as it develops and accumulates an operating history, which may be used to judge 
how far it meets targets stated in the business plan (Kolle, 2006).  
The survey by Ruhnka and Young (1987), and Wetzel (1981) agrees with Manigart et al., 
(2002) that, venture capitalists expect that the risk of loss associated with venture capital 
investments decreases steadily as a venture reaches higher stages of development.  
 
DEVELOPMENT STAGE DISCOUNT RATE DISCOUNT RATE 
 Wetzel (1981) Ruhnka & Young(1987, 1991) 
Seed 73% 50.0% 
Start-up 54.8% 50.0% 
Third stage 42.2% 37.5% 
Fourth stage (Expansion) 35.0% 30.0% 
Exit stage 35.0% 22.5% 
 
Source: Seppä and Laamanen (2001) 
 
Table 2 shows that venture capitalists use very high discount rates in assessing potential 
investments at the seed and startup phase. This phenomenon is caused by the very optimistic 
cash-flow projections made by entrepreneurs, but there is evidence that high discount rates are 
used even in the case of internal projections (Jones and Rhodes- Kropf, 2004). 
 
The discount rate (r) is calculated depending on the stage of the company (see Table 2). In 
standard setting r is a summation of the opportunity cost and a risk premium. The opportunity 
cost is the rate the invested money could be earning if it were invested at the risk free rate. 
This is the base of what the investor would demand assuming that there was no risk. The risk 
premium for the discount rate in the standard setting is attempting to make up for the risk 
inherent to the market, the systematic risk (Damodaran, 1994). With both of these, the VC 
gets the rate that would compensate him for an investment (Eq.1).  
 
r
std 
= [Time Value] + [Systematic Risk Premium]     ( Eq.1) 
      
 
Table 2: Venture Capitalists’ Discount Rate for Different Stages of Development 
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In the standard setting this is a fairly straightforward calculation that contains little to no error. 
However, in the venture capital setting the discount rate contains the same two factors plus 
several more. The additional factors within the discount rates used by venture capitalist in 
valuing start-up companies cause them to be significantly higher than in the standard 
situation. According to Scherlis and Sahlman (1986) the discount rate is a creation of several 
premiums stacked upon the risk free rate. They state that these additional premiums are: 
unsystematic risk (company specific), liquidity, value added and cash flow adjustment (Eq. 
2). (Scherlis and Sahlman, 1986) 
 
r
vc 
= [Time Value] + [Systematic Risk] + [Unsystematic Risk] + [Liquidity] + [Value 
Added] + [Cash Flow Adjustment]      (Eq. 2) 
 
The reasoning behind these additions is fairly easy to see. The venture capitalist is investing 
in a very different market when compared to the standard setting and so they are exposed to 
more types of risk and they have less opportunity to diversify this new risk away.  
 
2.3.4 DECISION CRITERION: PERFORMING COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 
 
Once the costs and benefits of the project have been identified and measured, the time horizon 
determined, and discount rate established, the analysis can be performed to evaluate the 
project. There are three kinds of general decision types that have been identified by 
Fuguitt and Wilcox (1999, 81);  
(1) One decision 
 (2) Several alternatives that is mutually exclusive  
 (3) Several alternatives that is not mutually exclusive. 
 
“Cost-benefit analysis is intended to evaluate options or alternatives. In the case where only 
one program or project is being evaluated (1), the alternatives are to either proceed with the 
project or not to proceed” (Fuguitt & Wilcox 1999, 81). When a venture capitalist is faced 
with several alternatives that are mutually exclusive (2) the choice is which one to implement. 
Mutually exclusive alternatives are those where only one can be executed because of scarce 
resources. When faced with several polices that are not mutually exclusive (3) the decision 
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maker can choose a subset of alternatives to employ the best use of funds (Fuguitt & Wilcox 
1999, 81). (See Table 3) 
           ALTERNATIVES                       CRITERION 
1. One Policy: Implement? NPV > 0 
2. Mutually exclusive policies: Choose one Maximum NPV 
3. Several Policies: Choose a subset  
          a. Dependent policies           
                i. No budget constraints Find possible combinations, maximum 
NPV 
                ii. Budget constraints Find affordable combinations, maximum 
NPV 
         b. Independent policies  
             i. No budget constraints All policies with NPV > 0 
             ii. Budget constraints Find affordable combinations, maximum 
NPV; rank by B/C for supplementary 
Information 
 
Source: Fuguitt and Wilcox (1999, 91) Cost-benefit Analysis for Public Sector Decision 
Makers 
 
2.3.5 SELECTION CRITERION 
 
The selection of the best policy depends on three rules in cost-benefit Analysis: Net Present 
Value (NPV), Internal Rate of Return (IRR) and Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR) (Nas, 1996). 
 
2.3.5.1 NET PRESENT VALUE 
 
Net Present Value (NPV) simply requires that the benefits exceed the cost of an investment 
project. “Alternately expressed, the position states that the total improvement by the gainers 
outweighs the combined setback of the losers, or the benefit-cost ratio is greater than one” 
(McKenna 1980, 148). This is a strong measure of the worth of a project. The project present 
value is a measure that is often used in conjunction with benefit-cost ratio. These two criteria 
Table 3: Appropriate Decision Criterion for Policy Types 
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allow for good decision making because they take into account the time value of money. 
Project present value is essentially the present value of a project using the annual capital flow 
S which is the annual benefits minus annual expenditures, the discount rate r and, the useful 
life of the project in number of years n. The present value annuity formula requires constant 
annual net flow for multiple years. 
 
Figure 2.1 Present Value Annuity Formula (Eq. 3) 
 
 
 
      (Eq. 3) 
Where S = Annual Net flow, r = Discount rate and n = Number of years 
 
 “In a single decision scenario, the best evaluation method is to find if the Net Present Value 
(NPV) is positive. NPV is the present value of incremental net benefits generated throughout 
the policy time horizon. The NPV is the present value of the benefits (PVB) minus present 
value of the costs (PVC). The details of the NPV calculations are (Eq. 5-6). 
 
NPV = PVB – PVC   (Eq. 4) 
 
In the year in which the initial expenditure is made, the exponent will be set at zero (this is 
because the cost is already at present value) and increase to represent each year of the project. 
All of these will be added together to find the PVB and PVC” (Fuguitt & Wilcox 1999, 76-
77).  
 
Net Present Value Calculations (Eq. 5-6) 
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  (Eq. 5) 
 
 
 
 
 
(Eq. 6) 
 
 
‘The expression B represents the incremental benefits, and C represents the incremental costs 
in one year. To find the surplus value, the venture capitalist can take the total benefits minus 
the total costs to find the net benefits. (Fuguitt & Wilcox, 1999). Further, the incremental 
benefits can be found by taking the benefits with the investment minus the benefits without 
the investment. The same formula can be used for incremental costs. (Cost with the 
investment) – (costs without the investment) = Incremental costs’ (Fuguitt & Wilcox 1999, 
58). “Net present value is the present value of incremental net benefits generated throughout 
the investment time horizon. If the PVB outweighs PVC then the net benefits are positive, 
(NPV > 0) and pursuing the investment promotes greater efficiency than not pursuing it” 
(Fuguitt & Wilcox 1999, 82).  
 
2.3.5.2 BENEFIT-COST RATIO (BCR) 
 
According to Nas (1996), a BCR is the ratio of the benefits of a project or proposal, expressed 
in monetary terms, relative to its costs, also expressed in monetary terms. All benefits and 
costs should be expressed in discounted present value. In the absence of funding constraints, 
the best value for money projects is those with the highest net present value. Where there is a 
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budget constraint, the ratio of NPV to the expenditure falling within the constraint should be 
used. In practice, the ratio of NPV to expenditure is expressed as a BCR. The NPV should be 
evaluated over the service life of the project. It is expressed as:  
      
B/C =Present value of Benefit/Present value of cost 
 
The project is accepted if the benefit-cost exceeds 1. A major shortcoming of BCRs is that, 
they ignore non-monetized impacts and the fact that there are no precise definitions of 
benefits and costs is problematic. B/C is sensitive to discount rate just like NPV. They both 
decline as discount rate increases. There is therefore an inverse relationship (Nas, 1996). Most 
venture capitalist seldom use this method when conducting a CBA even though it is the best 
method for calculating the profitability of an investment, it is applicable for investments 
which are consumed in less than one year and most venture capitals look beyond that when 
evaluating potential investment. 
 
2.3.5.3 INTERNAL RATE OF RETURN 
 
 ‘Internal rate of return is the flipside of Net present value and is based on the same principle 
and the same math. IRR computes a breakeven rate of return (Berkery, 2007). At any discount 
rate below the IRR an investment would result in a positive NPV (and should be made). If the 
appropriate discount rate is above the IRR, then the investment will result in negative NPV 
(and should be avoided). It’s the breakeven discount rate-the rate at which the value of cash 
outflows equals the value of cash inflows’ (Berkery, 2007). 
 
The IRR is easier to understand and can be calculated without having to estimate the cost of 
capital. It’s easier to compare investments of different sizes in terms of percentage rates of 
return than by dollars of NPV. Investors and analysts often use the required rate of return as a 
discount rate for future cash flows from an investment. Its main drawback is that, IRR 
overstates returns and has to be treated with caution and comparison is difficult among 
projects of various sizes (Nas, 1996). 
 
The Association of Investment Management Research (AIMR) has deemed the IRR as the 
most appropriate measure of returns presentation for venture and other private equity investor 
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investments. 2The European Venture Capital and Private Equity Association (EVCA) and The 
British Venture Capital Association (BVCA) have also adopted the IRR as the best measure 
of performance. For example, Venture Economics calculates annual IRR for each fund as 
cash-on-cash to the investors on a cumulative year-by year basis, modified to incorporate the 
year-end valuation of the partnership’s unliquidated holdings or residual value (Ibid). 
 
It is highly questionable whether a fund level IRR can be used as the discount rate on the 
project level. First, there is an issue with management fees and other costs associated with 
the management of the fund. Second, most funds invest their money in the project gradually, 
which means that they have quite large cash balances in the first years. Lastly such an 
approach implicitly assumes that all accepted projects are within the same risk class. 
 
2 .5 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Venture Capitalist using CBA to evaluate potential investment go through the following steps: 
 
1. Identify the cost and benefits in the investee firm 
2. Measure the costs and benefits in dollars 
3. Consider the costs and benefits over the life of the fund 
4. Take a decision   
 
There is therefore a tradeoff between generating return and controlling risk when venture 
capitalists evaluate potential investment. By identifying these costs and benefits, VCs can 
fully utilize their expertise and generate superior expected return.  The outcome of the 
analysis will enable the VC decide whether investment in a particular investee firm is 
financially feasible or not. 
These four steps discussed above, provide a “conceptual framework for assisting decision 
makers in understanding the decision situation” (McKenna, 1980, 127). Table 4 outlines the 
cost and benefit that venture capitalist should be on the lookout when evaluating potential 
venture capital investment using cost-benefit analysis and how they are measured. 
 
                                                          
2 http://www.ventureeconomics.com/vec/methodology.html  (Accessed 01 Feb 2009) 
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2.5.1 RESEARCH PURPOSE:  COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN THE CONTEXT 
OF VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENT DECISIONS  
COST: MEASUREMENT: 
Direct Cost (DC) 
• start up fund  
maintenance cost: 
• Management fee 
• Carried interest 
• Other expenses 
 
• Estimates investment cost in dollars at 
various rounds 
• Management fee is measured at 2% of 
total fund per annum. 
• 20% carried interest in the fund 
Indirect Cost (IC) 
• Uncertainty & Risk  (UR) 
• Size 
• Information asymmetry 
• Market structures 
 
• Estimates loss at 25%, 50%, 75% or 
100%. 
• Sensitivity analysis 
Other Indirect Cost (OIC) 
• File preparation cost 
• Investor search cost 
• Due diligence procedure cost 
• Protection of intellectual 
property cost 
• Negotiation and conclusion of 
financing cost 
• Reorganization cost  
 
• Qualitative analysis 
           BENEFITS:  
Direct benefits(DB) 
• Superior return on fund 
invested 
          Indirect benefits(IB) 
• Control rights 
 
• Estimates investment returns 
in dollars 
 
• Estimated qualitatively 
Table 4: Conceptual Framework – Listing of Costs and Benefits 
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DISCOUNT RATES  
• Seed  
• Start-up  
• Third stage  
• Fourth stage (Expansion)  
• Exit stage  
• 73% 
• 54.8% 
• 42.2% 
• 35.0% 
• 35.0% 
DECISION CRITERION MEASUREMENT: 
(PV) Present Value of Benefits and Costs 
 
(PV): The present value of an investment 
project is derived by using the annual 
capital flow, which is the annual benefits 
minus annual costs, in a formula with the 
discount rate and the useful life of the project 
in years. These variables will be used to 
determine the present value of the project 
today in future dollars. 
 
(NPV) Net Present Value 
 
(NPV): The Net Present Value is derived 
from the subtraction of the Present Value of 
the Benefits and the Present Value of the 
Costs. 
(BCR) Benefit-Cost Ratio 
 
(BCR): This is where the Present Value of 
Benefits and Costs must be divided by the 
Initial Capital Outlay of the investment. 
(IRR) Internal rate-of-return method 
 
IRR: Measures the performance of the fund 
and computes a breakeven rate of return. 
 
2.5.2 CALCULATING THE NET PRESENT VALUE 
 
In conducting a cost-benefit analysis, the present value of the benefits (PVB) and present 
value of the cost (PVC) of investing in a potential investee firm are summed and then the 
costs associated with taking that action are subtracted by the venture capitalist as a means of 
evaluating all potential costs and revenues that may be generated when the deal is structured. 
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Then the costs and benefits are considered over the life of the fund (T) .i.e. the future exit date 
in time that  the VC plan to exit typically 4-7 years after the investment is made in the  
investee company.  This is illustrated graphically below (Eq. 7-9); 
Total cost (TC) of the investment will thus be the sum of direct (DC), indirect (IC) and other 
indirect cost (OIC). Total Benefits (TB) comprises both direct (DB) and indirect benefits 
(IB). 
 
     (Eq. 7) 
 
       (Eq. 8) 
 
 The discount rate (r) used by venture capital firms is high due to the substantial risk inherent 
in this type of investment and the lack of diversification particularly during the early stages of 
investment (Manigart et al., 2002).  
 
      (Eq. 9) 
 
If the PVB outweighs PVC then the net benefits are positive, (NPV > 0) and so the venture 
capitalist can invest in that particular investee firm with NPV greater than zero. 
Internal Rate of Return is the flip side of Net Present Value (NPV), where NPV is the 
discounted value of a stream of cash flows, generated from an investment. IRR thus computes 
the break-even rate of return showing the discount rate, below which an investment results in 
a positive NPV as discussed above. Therefore the VC evaluating with the IRR can decide to 
invest in a particular project if its Internal Rate of Return exceeds the discount rate and 
rejected if this IRR is less than the discount rate.  
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CHAPTER THREE: SETTING – VENTURE CAPITAL 
INVESTMENT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 VENTURE CAPITAL INVESTMENT IN NORWAY 
 
The National Venture Capital Association (NVCA) in America defines venture capital as: 
“money provided by professionals who invest alongside management in young, rapidly 
growing companies that have the potential to develop into significant economic contributors. 
Venture capital is an important source of equity for start-up companies. Professionally 
managed venture capital firms are generally private partnerships or closely-held corporations 
funded by private and public pension funds, endowment funds, foundations, corporations, 
wealthy individuals, foreign investors, and the venture capitalists themselves.” (NVCA, 2006) 
 
The Norwegian Venture Capital & Private Equity Association (Norsk Venturkapitalforening – 
NVCA) was founded in March 2001 by the 12 leading players in Norway’s venture capital 
sector. Primary members of the association are independent professional investment 
companies and venture entities in corporate structure (Corporate Venture) with seed, venture 
or buyout investments as a substantial part of their business, and with a capital base of at least 
100 MNOK. The Norwegian Venture Capital & Private Equity Association had as of 10th of 
February 2009 a total of 90 members; 37 primary members and 53 associated members. 
 (Norsk Venturkapitalforening – NVCA, 2008) 
 
According to the VC and seed survey in 2008 by the Norske venture capital association, there 
are 54 management companies administrating 110 funds with EUR 6,7bn in total capital 
under management and EUR 540 million in total investments. In 2007, there was a 30% 
"Venture capital investments are like inefficiently priced stocks, with two differences. 
First because there are no short-selling mechanisms, a venture capitalist, like a 
commodity investor, faces potential overpricing. Second, unlike stocks, which represent 
existing assets, an early-stage venture capital project may be an idea." 
James H. Scott, Jr., "Managing Asset Classes," Financial Analysts Journal, January-
February 1994 
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increase at the end of the year and a 60% capital growth in buyout. A year-to-year change in 
the total investment amount and annual new and additional investment in capital raised in new 
funds indicates a general fluctuating trend. (See Figure 1) 
 
 
Source: Norske venture capital association survey, 2008 
 
A survey on the new annual investment by growth stage indicates a rapid increase in 
investment in the Startup stage firms. Notably, there has been a rapid shift of investment to 
buyout/replacement firms among Norwegian VC firms since the late 2003. According to the 
National Venture Capital Association in America, in 2006 most venture capitalist in America 
invested in companies in their later and Expansion stages with few VCs investing in seed and 
start-up stage firms. This assertion does not directly apply to the Norwegian venture capital 
firm in that, in the same year (2006), most Norwegian VC firm’s investment was in startup 
and not in the expansion and buyout stage in America as depicted in the Figure 2 and Figure 3 
below. 
 
Figure 1: Changes in Total Investment and New Funds 
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Source: Norske venture capital association survey, 2008 
 
Source: National Venture Capital Association in America, 2006 
Figure 2: American Venture Capital Investments by Stage of Development in 2006 
Figure 3: Norwegian Venture Capital Investments by Stage of Development in 2006 
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Norwegian funds have invested in 607 portfolio companies and the bulk of new companies 
are in energy, environment, computer and consumer Electronics. In 2007, there were larger 
investments into Norway than out of Norway. Yet, the presence of foreign funds through 
investments in Norway is limited to relatively few cases. Foreign presence as lead investor in 
early stage is relatively rare. See Table 5 
 
FUND TYPE NORWEGIAN COMPANIES FOREIGN COMPANIES 
Norwegian Funds 
Foreign Funds 
431 
35 
185 
      
   The domestic / Foreign matrix of investments (Mill EURO) 2008 
FUND TYPE NORWEGIAN COMPANIES FOREIGN COMPANIES 
Norwegian Funds 
Foreign Funds 
478 
92 
58 
       Source: Norske venture capital Association survey, 2008 
 
3.2 VENTURE CAPITAL VALUATION  
 
The VC investment process is a complex and unclear process (Benoit, 1975) and mostly starts 
with the decision to invest or not. They choose to invest in successful ventures that promise 
good returns and capital gains (Zacharakis and Meyer, 2000). According to Fichera (2001) 
venture capitalists follow a specific process called “Venture capital process” to make their 
investment decisions The first step in the VC process is screening business plans, followed by 
a personal meeting with the entrepreneur and then the conduct of due diligence before the 
investment is sunk (Fichera, 2001).  
 
The topic of how venture capitalists evaluate potential investments was first considered by 
Norton and Tenenbaum (1993), and Gupta and Sapienza (1992). Both papers use 
questionnaires and small samples of VC funds. Their specialization measures reflect the 
subjective intentions of VCs, but not the true investment patterns of the fund. Mayer et al., 
(2005) compare VC fund investment focus and sources of finance across Germany, Israel, 
Table 5: The Domestic / Foreign Matrix of Number of Portfolio Companies in Norway 
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Japan, and the United Kingdom. Their empirical results show some relationship between fund 
specialization and VC financing. However, much of the within and cross-country variation is 
not mainly due to sources of funds. The authors finally conclude that the pronounced 
differences of VC investment focus in these four countries are not primarily related to either 
financial systems or sources of funds. This study seeks to analyze how venture capitalists 
valuate potential investment.  
 
There several valuation methods available to venture capitalist when dealing with unlisted 
firms. Dittman et al., (2004) found that valuation methodologies had a statistically and 
economically meaningful impact on the investment performance of venture capitalists. 
Therefore, the proper choice of valuation method and the correct application of methodology 
are rather important.  
Standard finance textbooks recommend valuation methods based on discounted cash flow 
(DCF) analysis (Brigham et al., 1999, Brealey and Myers 2000). It is also possible to value 
companies by using multiples (comparable company method) or based on the value of a 
company’s assets. Nowadays, asset based valuation is usually not recommended any more, as 
the role of intangible assets and human capital in value creation is growing steadily. Still, 
there are some occasions, when the use of different variants of asset-based valuation may be 
appropriate. Probably the most innovative approach to valuation is a technique based on 
option pricing theory. Black and Scholes (1973) have argued that all corporate securities 
could be viewed as combinations of properly selected options. 
 
Valuation techniques developed in mainstream corporate finance are applicable in venture 
capital too, but access to information may pose a particular problem (Wright and Robbie 
1998). Early stage investments require valuation approaches that can handle uncertain and/or 
rapidly growing future cash flows in markets, which may scarcely be established (Ibid). From 
the techniques listed above, the option pricing approach has characteristics that fulfill most of 
those requirements. Most venture capital projects have many real options (e.g. growth 
options, options to stage investment etc.) attached to them. Besides, if staged financing is 
used, an additional flexibility is created. Traditional valuation techniques are not capable of 
valuing those real options correctly. Therefore it is of no surprise, that most of the recent 
academic research has taken this direction [Seppä and Laamenen (2001)]. 
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Here once again the differences between the theory and practice are quite remarkable. While 
academic research has taken the direction of applying option pricing models in the valuation 
of venture capital projects, these are rarely used in practice. 3The National Venture Capital 
Association (NVCA) in the United States recommends that the Private Equity Industry 
Guidelines Group (PEIGG) guidelines should be taken as the basis for valuation procedures. 
These guidelines emphasize the use of the concept of fair value (US Private Equity Valuation 
Guidelines 2004). In order to obtain fair value, an analyst should rely on recent cost or the 
latest round of financing data (Ibid). However, if subsequent events may have material impact 
on company value, one should perform multiples or comparable companies transaction 
methods (Ibid). DCF methods are recommended only on specific occasions (Ibid). 
 
3.3 VENTURE CAPITAL PRE- INVESTMENT ACTIVITIES 
 
Venture capitalists face information asymmetries with respect to potential investee company-
specific data; hence the entrepreneurs may only disclose that information they consider 
necessary to get the funding. Therefore, I expect that venture capitalists will tend to collect 
comparatively more information from their own and/or external sources compared to that 
produced by the potential investee company. We discuss the decision making process under 
three headings: due diligence, information for valuation and valuation methods used. 
 
3.3.1 DUE DILIGENCE 
 
Prior to the application of valuation methods the venture capital company will apply the 
process of due diligence. Information included in the business proposals of those companies 
seeking funding will be subject to extensive scrutiny by the venture capital firm to ascertain 
the robustness of the proposal (Fried and Hisrich, 1994). Due diligence involves using 
information from multiple sources. This information can be collected from references, reports 
or by visiting potential investee companies.  
In this process, the company's key employees, customers, suppliers, and creditors are 
consulted. The key evaluation criteria include product, management, market, returns, etc. 
(Tyebjee and Bruno, 1985; Fried and Hisrich, 1994).  It is this informing process that has 
come to be called “venture capital due diligence” Though the general objective of this due 
                                                          
3 http://www.nvca.org (Accessed 23 Feb 2009) 
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diligence process is to gain a thorough understanding of all business aspects, the focus of 
investigation may vary from deal to deal (Silver, 1985). Table 6 summarizes the factors VC 
looks for when performing their due diligence as discussed. 
 
SOURCES 
Hire experts to review specific parts of business plan 
Enquire from largest and critical suppliers of firms credibility 
Enquire about customers loyalty 
Depend on associations to know data on the market, its size and its growth rate 
Own market evaluation 
Independent accounting & audit report 
Never use the same reporting accountant as management’s accounting advisors 
Great reliance on personal references 
Source: extant literature 
 
3.3.2 INFORMATION FOR VALUATION 
 
Venture capital firms rely on a variety of information generated either by the entrepreneurs or 
within the venture capital firm itself, or an external source may be used. Examples of 
information sources are interviews with the entrepreneur, the business proposal, contacts with 
other venture capital firms, statistical information services, trade journals etc. The process of 
due diligence itself can generate pertinent information (Wright and Robbie, 1996). The 
reliance upon such diverse sources of information reflects the information gap when dealing 
with unquoted companies. Two studies have examined the sources of information used when 
preparing a valuation (Wright and Robbie, 1996; Manigart et al., 1997). 
 
In their UK study, Wright and Robbie (1996) examined 22 sources of information in 
preparing a valuation. The results indicated that the main source of information was the 
venture capital firm’s own due diligence; this was considered more influential than the due 
diligence requested from accounting and consulting firms. Accounting statements included in 
the business proposals was the next most influential set of information, especially the profit 
and loss account. Also of considerable influence were the latest un-audited financial 
statements and management projections for one year ahead. The C.V. of the management, 
Table 6: Summary of VC due diligence process 
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sales and marketing information, interviews with management and proposed exit timing were 
all considered important. Publicly available sources of information such as the financial press 
trade journals and external statistical and information services were lowly rated. Manigart, et 
al., (1997) conducted a comparative study of the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium and France. 
The results in general supported Wright and Robbie but with some differences between 
countries. 
 
Besides several teaching notes on financial valuation methods (e.g., Gompers, 1999; Lerner 
and Willinge, 2002), the most relevant industry report on startup valuation is perhaps Hill and 
Power (2001), which asks venture capitalists to rate a number of factors when evaluating a 
deal, with a rating of 5 being the most important and 1 being the least important. The top 
factors are reported below (Table 7): 
 
Key Factor Points 
Quality of Management 4.5 
Size of the market 3.8 
Product qualities 3.7 
Rate of market growth 3.5 
Competition 3.5 
Barriers to entry 3.4 
Company’s stage of development 3.2 
Industry that the company is in 3.0 
 
Manigart et al., (2000) also identified the sources of VC information for valuation in Table 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7: Relative Importance of Key Factors in Venture Capitalists’ Valuation of New Ventures. 
Hill and Power (2001) 
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SOURCES 
Curriculum vitae of management 
interview with entrepreneurs 
production capacity/technical information 
own due diligence report 
due diligence by accounting/consulting firms 
Business plan (overall consistency of plan) 
Business plan (more than 1 year ahead) 
interview with other firm personnel 
sales and marketing information 
Source: Manigart et al., (2000) 
 
The sources of information identified by Manigart et al., (2000) and Hill and Power (2001) 
among other researchers influence the decisions of most venture capitalist in the economic 
valuation of a new business venture. 
 
3.3.3 VALUATION METHODS 
 
After the venture capital firms have carried out their due diligence and collected information 
needed for valuation they decide upon the pertinent valuation methods to use. A number of 
researchers have identified some characteristics of unquoted companies, or its shares. The 
lack of publicly available information, the poor initial cash flows, the profit prospects, the 
high risk and uncertainty are considered to be salient features of this class of company. 
Moreover, any shares are less marketable and the company generally has a shorter track 
record and a less experienced management team (Tyebjee and Bruno, 1984; Pike and Neale, 
1998). These characteristics of unquoted companies pose obvious problems for valuation. 
Manigart et al., (2000) notes that in the US and Europe venture capital firms demonstrate 
differences in the valuation methods they adopt.  
 
Table 8: Sources of VC Information for Valuation 
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Two valuation approaches that have received particular attention in the literature are 
discounted dividend yield methods and discounted future cash flow methods. In fact venture 
capital firms, for two reasons, rarely use the dividend yield method. First, most venture capital 
investments are placed in the early stages of a company’s development, in which dividends 
are rarely being distributed. Second, if the investment is in the expansion, or later stages, in 
the potential investee companies a request for funds from a venture capitalist is likely to 
reflect cash constraints and thus dividends may not be evident (Wright and Robbie, 1996; 
Manigart, et al., 1997). 
 
Research into the use of discounted cash flow techniques by venture capital companies has 
produced contradictory results. The results of the UK study, Wright and Robbie (1996) found 
that discounted cash flows appeared to be used much more frequently than the valuation of 
the assets of the company. Despite the results of this research Wright and Robbie (1998) did 
not recommend the use of such methods for startup companies, because it is very difficult to 
forecast future cash flows. In their international comparative study, Manigart, et al., (1997) 
proposed overcoming this disadvantage by using sensitivity analysis. The venture capitalist 
conducts sensitivity analysis by themselves or with outside help from accountants and/or 
consultants. Dixon (1991) reported that, for the United Kingdom, sensitivity analysis is used 
by the venture capitalists to affirm that the financial projections are based on reasonable 
assumptions. Dixon found that 63% of his sample had used sensitivity analysis. Tyebjee and 
Bruno (1984) found, for the United States, that venture capitalists prefer to use sensitivity 
analysis to determine the expected rate of return.  
 
Accounting-based valuation methods include the accounting valuation of the company’s 
assets at historical cost, replacement or liquidation value and the book value of the equity. 
Lorenz (1989) has argued that in the early stages of venture capital investment these asset 
based valuations are not credible. However, such approaches may be used as a secondary 
basis for valuation in the later stages of financing, particularly in the case of buy-outs. In a 
UK study, Wright and Robbie, (1996) noted that accounting methods may be common for 
bank debt analysis, two-fifths of the respondents almost never used replacement cost asset 
value or liquidation value asset methods, and a third did not use historic book value methods.  
One of the main methods for analyzing earnings is the use of the price-earnings ratio. Lockett 
et al., (2002) argue that comparators and rules of thumb may be used due to the difficulties of 
making cash flow forecasts. For the P/E ratio, the most important issue is the appropriate 
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benchmark P/E to apply. Some UK researchers prefer to use the P: E ratio of a peer quoted 
company that is one similar in all or most respects, to the unquoted company (Lorenz, 1989).  
 
Other US researchers prefer to take a sample of similar quoted companies and find a weighted 
average P: E based upon the individual P: E figures and use market capitalizations’ as weights 
(market value for all shares issued) (Pike and Neale, 1998). Previous research generally 
agrees that the valuation methods applicable to quoted companies are problematic when 
applied to unquoted companies. It might be advisable for the valuer of unquoted companies to 
use a variety of complimentary techniques (for example using sensitivity analysis alongside 
the application of discounted cash flow techniques). It is also possible for the valuer to use the 
valuation of similar quoted companies, when valuing unquoted companies (for example, 
using the P/E of similar quoted company). The research reported in this paper empirically 
evaluates the use of different methods of valuation by venture capital firms in the Norwegian 
venture capital market. 
 
Corporate finance literature reports four valuation methods most commonly used in startup 
valuation: discounted cash flow, earnings multiple, net asset, and venture capital method. 
However, none of these approaches is fully satisfactory for new entrepreneurial firms. A 
fundamental assumption underlying these financial valuation methods is that there is an 
efficient capital market for the ownership of the firm. This assumption may be workable for 
the public capital market, as legal rules are in place, which regulate public firms to release all 
material information to the market and private information is not as common (Fama, 1991). 
Traded in a competitive market, the ownership of these firms is also highly liquid. This 
perfect capital market assumption may approximately hold for public companies, but may not 
hold in capital markets for new ventures. The venture capital market is arguably an inefficient 
market and quite different in several aspects from the public capital market (Lerner, 2000). 
First, venture capitalists invest in private and new ventures. New ventures have a short 
operating history, and thus accounting information is limited, making the new venture’s future 
cash flows difficult to estimate. Second, the law does not require that private firms report any 
financial or management information. Such information is difficult to collect and to verify. 
Thus, the information asymmetry between entrepreneur and potential investors is typically 
high. Finally, most of the assets of these entrepreneurial firms are intangible and highly firm 
specific (Gompers and Lerner, 2001). 
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The inefficiency of the venture capital market renders the four major financial valuations 
methods less satisfactory in valuating new ventures (Timmons and Spinelli, 2004). For DCF 
approach, it is difficult to estimate the future cash flows and to determine the appropriate 
discount rate. For the earnings multiple approach, three challenges exist. First, most new 
ventures do not have earnings. Second, defining the boundary of the reference group (to 
determine the multiple) is not always easy or even possible (e.g., for some breakthrough 
innovations – such as the personal computer or biotechnology firms at their infant stage). 
Third, even if the reference group is defined, it is still quite subjective to choose the multiples 
and there is no theoretical guidance for this choice. The limitation of the net assets approach 
is that it ignores the economic value of growth opportunities and, most new ventures do not 
have substantial levels of tangible assets. Finally, the venture capital method is very 
subjective and the valuation computed is not easy to justify (Gompers, 1999). 
 
The deficiencies of the above methods are well documented in Waldron and Hubbard (1991). 
Inviting thirty-one valuation experts (e.g., venture capitalists, valuation consultants and 
business professors) to place an economic value on a small avionic company acquired by 
Goodyear, Waldron and Hubbard (1991) find these financial valuation experts provided 
valuation estimates ranging from $6 million to $17.5 million for the same company based on 
exactly the same information. Waldron and Hubbard conclude that: "From these results it is 
easy to see why so many consider the valuation of a closely held business akin to alchemy" 
(1991:49). 4The National Venture Capital Association (NVCA) in the United States 
recommends that the Private Equity Industry Guidelines Group (PEIGG) guidelines should be 
taken as the basis for valuation procedures. These guidelines emphasize the use of the concept 
of fair value (US Private Equity Valuation Guidelines, 2004). In order to obtain fair value, an 
analyst should rely on recent cost or the latest round of financing data (Ibid). However, if 
subsequent events may have material impact on company value, one should perform multiples 
or comparable companies transaction methods (Ibid). DCF methods are recommended only 
on specific occasions (Ibid). 
 
3.6 POST-INVESTMENT ACTIVITIES  
Venture capitalists' active involvement in their investee firms is related to information 
asymmetry and an extended period of illiquidity. Any information asymmetry venture 
                                                          
4 http://www.nvca.org (Accessed 09 March 2009) 
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capitalists face can cause significant agency risks. An extended period of illiquidity, in turn, 
can result in a questionable exit scenario and poor returns. In order to reflect current market 
conditions and changes in business opportunity, business plans, operational goals, and 
shareholder agreements need to be regularly evaluated and revised, from time to time, after 
the initial deal is closed (Sadtler, 1993). While venture capitalists' participation in an investee 
firm varies from deal to deal, new ventures require more assistance than developed businesses 
(Sapienza, 1992; Barry, 1994). 
Achieving an exit, or divestment, is the most important of the post-investment activities. 
Divestment is driven by a venture capitalists need to generate a profit for their capital 
providers and partners. This process can be achieved through two common routes: a public 
offering (IPO), or a trade sale to strategic investors. Regardless, each exit route has a different 
consequence for both venture capitalists and entrepreneurs (Rind, 1997). Investee firms 
generally favor a public offering because it preserves the independence of both the firm and 
the entrepreneurs, in addition to providing the firm with continued access to capital. For 
venture capitalists, a public offering rarely concludes their relationship with the investee firm, 
as the underwriters can prevent venture capitalists from disposing of all shares at the time of 
an initial public offering (IPO). Private sales, in comparison, will almost certainly end a 
venture capitalists involvement with the investee firm (Rind, 1997). Depending upon the 
venture capitalists` investment strategy, VC firms exit in 3-4 years and 10 years (Bygrave and 
Timmons, 1992).  
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CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This section explains how data for the research work is gathered. Explaining the methodology 
aids in validating that the study was thorough in its approach and accurate in its finding. 
 
4.2 DATA COLLECTION 
 
A questionnaire survey was conducted with the Norwegian VC firms directly through 15 
venture capital firms who are among the primary members of the Norwegian Venture Capital 
Association (NVCA). A total of 37 questionnaire forms were distributed from late March to 
mid April of 2009. Following the sending of the first questionnaire form, non-responding VC 
firms were approached directly via telephone and E-mail on a number of times.  This paper 
analyzes the responses returned by 15 VC firms in Norway representing 40.5% (15 completed 
and usable replies out of 37 potential respondents) before the end of May 2009 and this is 
defined as the population for the research.  
 
Interviews constituted the second most important method of the research. Structured 
interviews were carried out among Norwegian venture capitalists at their offices with 
managing partners, and sometimes with financial managers and accountants. Each person 
interviewed is associated with an established venture capital fund. The amount of funds under 
management varies from $75 to $448 million, with a mean fund size of $215.4 million and a 
median fund size of $200 million. Almost all interviewees wanted to remain anonymous. 
Although the interviews with the venture capitalists were not recorded, the researcher can 
assure the reliability of the study. A case study protocol was used and written notes were 
taken concerning those VC firms using cost-benefit analysis. The reliability is high because of 
the interview technique. Case study interviews were used, which enabled the interviewer to 
explain and discuss the problems and questions. This ensured that the interviewee really had 
understood the question. As it was an advanced finance research, this technique was in 
accordance with the objectives. 
 
The data collected from the questionnaire is both continuous and discrete involving 
measurements on both ordinal and nominal scales. This means that the appropriate form of 
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statistical analysis of the data is non parametric. Descriptive data about the firm, such as fund 
size and investment stages and focus of particular interest were available on the company 
websites. Descriptive statistics are also used to highlight the apparent degrees of consensus or 
difference in processes of due diligence and valuation methods as well as the cost-benefit 
findings.  
The analysis of Cost-benefit analysis includes five venture capital cases. The cases are not 
sampling units, but experiments or multiple surveys –– a multiple-case study design is used. 
The author takes a holistic view and use a single unit of analysis to make analytical rather 
than statistical generalizations. The cases and written questionnaires were analyzed for 
specific activities performed by venture capitalists. The descriptions of the cases are presented 
as follows. 
CASE A: Invest in almost any industry, except shipping and real-estate in its start-up-phase. 
It is located in Bergen. 
 
CASE B: Focuses on technology companies within electronics, software, oil & gas, materials 
and clean technology companies originating in the Nordic countries. It is based in Trondheim. 
They only invest in companies in their expansion stage. 
 
CASE C: It has no industrial limitations, but invests in naturally based IT/technology, energy 
and manufacturing companies in their second stage. It is located in Stavanger. 
 
CASE D: Invest in small, but established companies with roots in Scandinavia, primarily in 
Norway. They finance companies in their mezzanine stage and they are based in Oslo 
 
CASE E: Targets companies where it foresees significant potential for top-line growth, 
strategic repositioning and/or operational improvements in engineering/technology, food and 
beverage, IT and telecommunication, maritime equipment, oil Services, power and energy, 
retail, services and outsourcing in their startup phase. It is based in Oslo  
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4.3 EXPERT EVALUATION  
 
After the analysis, we presented the results of the initial study to different individuals in a 
selected VC firms based on their co-operation and willingness to contribute mindfully to this 
research work. Two of the five are large Oslo firms emphasizing late and early stage 
investments; one is a large Trondheim firm that invests in early stages; one is a Stavanger 
venture capital firm that focuses on large, late-stage investments; and one is a moderately 
small, Bergen-based VC firm that also invests in late-stage investments.  
Each was mailed a summary of the analysis and we made further modifications based on their 
responses.  
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
 
 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This section empirically evaluates the results of a statistical analysis of differences in the 
behavior of venture capital firms in their use of due diligence, information sources for 
valuation, and their choice of valuation method. I further validate Cost-benefit analysis in the 
context of venture capital investment decisions as a valuation method. The discussion, which 
follows, presents and evaluates the results of the findings.  
 
5.2 RESULTS 
 
The findings on how venture capital firms evaluate potential investment are categorized under 
three headings as discussed in chapter 3: due diligence, information for valuation and 
valuation methods used. 
 
5.2.1 DUE DILIGENCE 
 
In a telephone interview, respondents were asked to rate the importance of the sources of 
information for the application of due diligence in the valuation of potential investment. To 
determine which firms to invest in, VC were asked to rate the following items on a five-point 
scale of 1 (least important) to 5 (very important). Table 9 presents the main sources of due 
diligence information for the preparation of a valuation and reports the frequency of responses 
in each level of importance for each source of information to the whole population of venture 
capital firms in our sample frame. The list of information sources is derived from the extant 
literature in this area and covers the examples previously discussed and the results are 
expressed in percentages and in absolute numbers.  
‘If you want to succeed, you should strike out on new paths rather than travel the 
worn paths of accepted businesses - John D. Rockefeller 
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No SOURCES 5* 4 3 2 1 
1 Hire experts to review specific parts of 
business plan 
26.7% 
(4) 
40% 
(6) 
1z3.3% 
(2) 
13.3% 
(2) 
6.7% 
(1) 
2 Enquire from largest and critical suppliers of 
firms credibility 
46.7% 
(7) 
33.3% 
(5) 
6.7% 
(1) 
13.3% 
(2) 
- 
3 Enquire about customers loyalty 60.0% 
(9) 
33.3% 
(5) 
6.7% 
(1) 
- - 
4 Depend on associations to know data on the 
market, its size and its growth rate 
6.7% 
(1) 
40% 
(6) 
33.3% 
(5) 
13.3% 
(2) 
6.7% 
(1) 
5 Own market evaluation 53.3% 
(8) 
33.3% 
(5) 
6.7% 
(1) 
6.7% 
(1) 
- 
6 Independent accounting & audit report 6.7% 
(1) 
13.3% 
(2) 
46.7% 
(7) 
26.7% 
(4) 
6.7% 
(1) 
7 Never use the same reporting accountant as 
management’s accounting advisors 
- 26.7% 
(4) 
40% 
(6) 
6.7% 
(1) 
26.7% 
(4) 
8 Great reliance on personal references 86.7% 
(13) 
13.3% 
(2) 
- - - 
* Score 5: Very important, score 4: Important, score 3: Moderately important, score 2: 
Slightly important, Score 1: Least important. 
 
The results from this survey reveals that, the large percentages that call on customers (60.0% 
score 5), carry out their own market valuation (53.3% score 5), do not depend upon trade 
associations etc (6.7% score 5) but place great reliance upon personal references (86.7% score 
5). The results confirm the importance of a wide range of sources of information when 
dealing with unquoted companies.  
 
5.2.2 SOURCES OF INFORMATION FOR VALUATION 
 
I further asked the respondents to value how the following sources of information affected 
their valuation of potential investment. To determine which firms to invest in, VC were again 
Table 9: The Importance of the Due Diligence Sources for the Total Venture Capital Firms 
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asked to rate the following items on a five-point scale of 1 (least important) to 5 (very 
important). Table 10 presents the main sources of information for the preparation of a 
valuation and the items  selected were based on the study by Manigart et al., (2000); the 
curriculum vitae of management, interview with entrepreneurs, production capacity/technical 
information, own due diligence report, due diligence by accounting/consulting firms, business 
plan (overall consistency of business plan), business plan (management projections, more 
than 1 year ahead), interview with other firm personnel, and sales and marketing information. 
 
 SOURCES *(5) (4) (3) (2) (1) 
1 Curriculum vitae of management 86.7% 
(13) 
13.3% 
(2) 
- - - 
2 interview with entrepreneurs 6.7% 
(1) 
66.7% 
(10) 
20% 
(3) 
6.7% 
(1) 
- 
3 production capacity/technical information 26.7% 
(4) 
26.7% 
(4) 
26.7% 
(4) 
13.3% 
(2) 
6.7% 
(1) 
4 own due diligence report 6.7% 
(1) 
46.7% 
(7) 
13.3% 
(2) 
20% 
(3) 
13.3% 
(2) 
5 due diligence by accounting/consulting 
firms 
6.7% 
(1) 
13.3% 
(2) 
6.7% 
(1) 
40% 
(6) 
33.3% 
(5) 
6 Business plan (overall consistency of 
plan) 
- 33.3% 
(5) 
6.7% 
(1) 
6.7% 
(1) 
53.3% 
(8) 
7 Business plan (more than 1 year ahead) 40% 
(6) 
26.7% 
(4) 
- 20% 
(3) 
13.3% 
(2) 
8 interview with other firm personnel 40% 
(6) 
26.7% 
(4) 
20% 
(3) 
- 13.3% 
(2) 
9 sales and marketing information - 26.7% 
(4) 
26.7% 
(4) 
26.7% 
(4) 
6.7% 
(1) 
* Score 5: Very important, score 4: Important, score 3: Moderately important, score 2: 
Slightly important, Score 1: Least important. 
 
The results expressed in percentages and absolute numbers reveal that, the curriculum vitae of 
management was rated the most important on average followed by interview with 
Table 10:  Venture Capital Evaluation vs. Source of Information [Manigart et al., (2000)] 
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entrepreneurs. (See Table 9) These appear to be more important than financial statements 
including the business plan. Comparing my results to Manigart et al., (2000) substantiates the 
claim that Norwegian venture capital firms are keen on the curriculum vitae of management 
and interview with entrepreneurs in making their investment decisions in relation to VC from 
the rest of the world 
 
5.2.3 VALUATION METHODS USED 
 
Then respondents were asked what methods they used in evaluating potential investment. 
VC were asked to rate the followings items on a scale of 1 (never use) to 5 (always use). 
These items were selected based on the studies by Timmons (1992) and Manigart et al., 
(2000) adjusted to include cost-benefit analysis option and sensitivity analysis for the purpose 
of this research work. The options are: Cost-benefit analysis, discounted value of free cash 
flows (DCF), capitalized maintainable earning (P/E multiples), capitalized maintainable 
earning (EBIT multiples), payback period, dividend yield basis and sensitivity analysis. 
 
 METHODS *(5) (4) (3) (2) (1) 
1 CBA 33.3% 
(5) 
- - - 66.7% 
(10) 
2 DISCOUNTED FUTURE 
CASH FLOW 
- 6.7% 
(1) 
6.7% 
(1) 
13.3% 
(2) 
73.3% 
(11) 
3 P/E MULTIPLES 66.7% 
(10) 
26.7% 
(4) 
- - 6.7% 
(1) 
4 EBIT MULTIPLES 20% 
(3) 
20.0% 
(3) 
20.0% 
(3) 
20.0% 
(3) 
20.0.% 
(3) 
5 PAYBACK PERIOD 80% 
(12) 
13.3% 
(2) 
- - 6.7% 
(1) 
6 DIVIDEND YIELD BASIS - 6.7% 
(1) 
6.7% 
(1) 
6.7% 
(1) 
80.0% 
(12) 
7 USE OF SENSITIVITY 
ANALYSIS 
33:3% 
(5) 
20.0% 
(3) 
33.3% 
(5) 
6.7% 
(1) 
6.7% 
(1) 
* Score 5: Always use, score 4: Usually, score 3: Sometimes, score 2: Seldom, score 1: Never use. 
Table 11: Valuation Methods in the Total Venture Capital Firms (% of the respondents) 
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Table 11 presents the frequency with which the main methods of valuation are used by 
venture capital firms in Norway. The responses expressed in percentages and in absolute 
numbers reported in the table above relates to the whole population in our sample frame. A 
five-point scale is used to ascertain the regularity of use of the method ranging from always 
use (score 5) to never use (score 1). The table reports the frequency of responses in each level 
of usage for each valuation method.  
 Among Norwegian venture capital firms, the payback period (80% score 5) was ranked the 
highest on average, followed by capitalized maintainable earning (P/E multiples) (66.7% 
score 5) (See Table 11). Interestingly cost-benefit analysis and sensitivity analysis are used 
equally in potential investment evaluation. However, the CBA is either used or not used at all 
as compared to the sensitivity analysis which is fairly used by most VC firms in Norway. 
Despite the informational advantages of sensitivity analysis discussed above just few VC 
firms in our sample used this technique. This result contradicts evidence from the UK study of 
Dixon (1991) who found that sensitivity analysis was considered important in helping to 
determine a project’s potential returns by 63% of the sample in his study. 
Despite the weaknesses in valuation with the payback period such as not taking into account 
the time value of money, opportunity cost, potential risks, and other factors most VC in 
Norway use the payback period in evaluating potential investment. This contradicts the 
findings by Manigart et al., (1997) who found that the valuation methods usually used in the 
UK are earnings multiples and not the payback period.  
 
I investigated why Norwegian VC firms use the payback period in evaluating potential 
investment. In a telephone interview with VC firms who invariably used the payback period, 
67% of the respondents opted for that option because it eliminates projects whose returns do 
not materialize until later years and thus emphasizes the earliest returns and because time is 
crucial to the venture capitalist, using that method I rewarding. Also, payback period could be 
used as a rough screening device to filter out those riskier projects, which have long lives. 
Those VC firms who are not listed on the stock exchange preferred that method because of its 
ease of use and understanding but were quick to add that, as the company developed, other 
valuation methods will be adopted. 
 
Gompers (1999) identified three flaws in the use of the earnings multiple approaches: First, 
most new ventures do not have earnings. Second, defining the boundary of the reference 
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group (to determine the multiple) is not always easy or even possible Third, even if the 
reference group is defined, it is still quite subjective to choose the multiples and there is no 
theoretical guidance for this choice. Notwithstanding, this method appears to be the second 
most important method used in Norway which was also found to be the mostly used method 
in UK by Manigart et al., (1997). My investigation revealed that, most VC use this approach 
because it shows how much they are willing to pay per earnings but its usage was also 
subjective. 
 
5.4 COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES AS A VALUATION TOOL 
 
The analysis includes five venture capital firms in Norway who use cost-benefit analysis in 
evaluating potential investment in our sample frame. The analysis is presented as cases.   
Galambos and Schreiber (1978, 62-63) identify four steps for a successful cost-benefit 
analysis as discussed in the literature review. These steps are:  identifying the cost and 
benefits of the project, measuring the costs and benefits in dollars, considering the costs and 
benefits over the life of the project and finally, reaching a decision. Respondents were 
therefore asked whether they went through this cost-benefit analysis process in evaluating 
potential investment and to describe an alternative procedure other than this. Interestingly, all 
the firms admitted using this process in evaluating potential investment. (See Table 12)  
 
I further asked respondents which investment rule they used in performing their cost-benefit 
analysis. 4 out of the 5 firms use the internal rate of return (IRR), only one uses the net 
present value (NPV) and none uses the benefit-cost ratio (BCR).   Dixon (1991) reported that 
93% of his sample evaluated projects in terms of their internal rate of return (IRR) which is 
similar to VC firms in Norway using cost benefit analysis. (See Table 12)  These VC 
preferred the IRR to the NPV because they deemed the NPV as a cumbersome measurement 
process and it was highly improbable to keep score year by year to ascertain whether the 
project is generating positive values. Also, the higher a project's internal rate of return, the 
more desirable it is to undertake the project and IRR can be used to rank several prospective 
investee firms the VC is considering.  NPV only gives an indication of the value of the money 
today but not the exact discount rate of the project. Thus, whiles IRR spells out your safety 
margin, the NPV only assumes a discount rate. Notwithstanding this, IRR is the flip side of 
the net present value (NPV) and much of the same method is followed in its calculation.  
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According to most VC interviewed, determination of the discount rate in deciding the net 
worth of an investee firm is the most important factor. Notwithstanding this, most venture 
capitalists in Norway using CBA do not have a measure of the discount rate used. Even 
though they preferred to use the internal rate of return (IRR), I gathered that the determination 
of discount rate by these VC firms were more intuitive. In that, some VC considered the 
systematic and non-systematic risk which results in an otherwise large discount rate as a result 
of the enormous risk. This is peculiar to Case A   
 
‘We invest in seed and start up staged companies. Superior return on capital invested is what 
keeps us in business. Returns greater than what ordinary financial intermediaries anticipate 
is our goal. As a result, the internal rate of return (IRR) is considered the discount rate in 
evaluating each investment project. We do not have a model for the cost of capital –this is 
determined intuitively and also we do not take the systematic risk into consideration when 
determining the discount rate.’  
                                                                                                                  CASE A REPRESENTATIVE 
 
 
It is interesting that systematic risk is not taken into consideration when deciding the discount 
rate in this highly illiquid and risky business. this could partly be because they understand that  
ultimate success depends mostly on business and technological risk (non-systematic risk) than 
on interest and exchange rate ( systematic risk) and that non- systematic risk can  be 
eliminated through diversification even though VC are limited to the extent of their 
diversification. 
The required rate of return mostly depends on different risks. A mean-variance model as a 
close approximation of the required rate of return is used in case B.  
 
‘We consider the internal rate of return (IRR) as our discount rate and do not use any 
complicated financial models. We are convinced that the calculation of the cost of capital is 
an art: there is no difference between returns like 30% and 35%. We only invest in expansion 
stage and the discount rate is at 30% but we accept any rate less than that at a much lower 
standard deviation. To us, there is no difference between getting high returns with large risks, 
or a lower return with no risk at all. Systematic risk is not strictly adhered to.’ 
 
                                                                                      CASE B REPRESENTATIVE 
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In case C, D and E, the internal rate of return is a measure of the discount rate as well and all 
these firms take the systematic risk into consideration when evaluating the discount rate. 
These firms invest in the second stage, mezzanine stage and start-up stage of the company 
development respectively. According to Manigart et al., (2002) the discount rate at Seed up: 
80%, startup: 50-70%, First stage: 40-60%, second stage: 30-50%, Bridge/Mezzanine: 20-
35%, public expectation: 15-25% (Manigart et al., 2002). 
 
‘Our mission statement is an expectation of high returns on capital invested. As traditional 
venture capitalist and second stage financiers our minimal discount rate is at 28% and we do 
our best to avoid all forms of non-systematic risk but invariably pay particular attention to 
systematic risk. The IRR is the measure of discount rate and realized returns.’  
                                                                                 CASE C REPRESENTATIVE 
 
 
There are other venture capital firms who are strategist and believe that achieving corporate 
goal of high return on capital invested is conceivable by strategically positioning itself below 
the expected discount rate. To this firm, the determination of the discount rate is connected to 
risks and type of financing. This applies to case D. 
 
 
‘The discount rate is derived by positioning. Most retail banks require interest rate of 4-8%, 
second stage VC firms require around 30-50% and mezzanine financiers 20-35%. Even 
though we invest in companies in the Mezzanine or bridge phase, we use a much lower 
discount rate between 15-20% and make sure we at least break even. To us, systematic risk is 
an extremely important factor in the determination of the discount rate’.  
 
                                                                                                                CASE D REPRESENTATIVE 
 
 
The Net present Value is an important criterion. Most venture capitalist never accepts to fund 
investment project with a negative NPV. Case E uses the Net present value (NPV) in 
evaluating potential investment. 
 
‘We use the Net present value and not the IRR .We do not accept the financing of any 
investment project with a negative NPV and  non- systematic risk is of little importance to us 
in determining the discount rate to use, however, the overall risk is very important because 
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we cannot take chances. As startup financiers, we use a relatively higher discount rate in our 
computation invariably. However, there have been situations we have acted against the norm.    
                                                                                                                CASE E REPRESENTATIVE 
 
 
The results are found in Table 12. It can be deduced that, these VC firms require quite a high 
rate of return due to the risky nature of the business. The survey conducted among Norwegian 
venture capitalists showed that the discount rate was within approximation depending on the 
financing stage of potential investee firm which is in conformity with the study made by 
Manigart et al., (2002). This substantiates the fact that Norwegian venture capitalist returns 
are around the same interval as in the rest of the world as expressed below. 
 
 
CASES CASE A CASE B CASE C CASE D CASE E 
INVESTMENT 
RULE 
IRR IRR IRR IRR NPV 
DISCOUNT 
RATE 
50-70% 20-30% 28-30% 15-20% 50-70% 
SYSTEMATIC 
RISK 
NO NO YES YES NO 
CBA 
PROCESS? 
YES YES YES YES YES 
 
 
 
 
Nonetheless, firms using cost-benefit analysis also used other valuation methods when 
making financing decisions. Some firms used CBA and other valuation methods 
concomitantly whiles others used alternatives to avoid unbiased estimate during evaluation. 
Case A uses the discounted cash flow methods, and the representatives from case B, C, D, and 
E basically agreed on the same approach. Below are the views expressed by these 
representatives on other valuation methods used: 
 
‘We use venture capital and the discounted cash flow (DCF) methods and comparable prices 
to evaluate enterprises. Illiquidity premium determination is the most complicated issue in the 
valuation process. We make the projected statements for 5 years. The most important is 
the human capital valuation not the numerical analysis. We also use some elements of the real 
option method because we evaluate the outgoing option and make sure we rule out all forms 
of biases. We sometimes introduce multiples due to its simplicity nature.’ 
Table 12: CBA Survey Responses 
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                                                                                               CASE A REPRESENTATIVES 
 
Capital budgeting and the estimation of future cash flows are the problems. We can make a 
profound prognosis and find a return based on complicated models, but it may not materialize 
due to risk and uncertainty. We make the estimations ourselves because we cannot trust the 
entrepreneurs. The valuation is based on payback period, but we do not use the whole model 
due to continuous value problems. It may give a very biased estimate and so we sometimes 
introduce PE Multiples and other subjective models peculiar to our firm. 
 
                                                                               CASE B, C, D&E REPRESENTATIVES 
 
The author concludes that all the venture capitalist that used cost benefit analysis also used 
multiples and other valuation methods subjective to the VC firms. I deduced that their main 
goal was superior return on investment and so they all used methods via experience that made 
their goals attainable.  
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This final chapter provides a summary of the analysis that has been performed. 
Recommendations for future cost-benefit analysis for venture capitalist are provided in this 
chapter. These recommendations are related to this study of cost-benefit analysis for venture 
capital investment decisions.  
 
6.2 SUMMARY 
 
This paper discusses the results of the analysis for the following research questions; “How do 
Norwegian VC firms evaluate potential investments?” and “How could cost benefit analysis 
(CBA) be used in the context of venture capital investment decisions?” The results can be 
summarized as follows. 
 
6.2.1 HOW DO VENTURE CAPITAL FIRMS IN NORWAY EVALUATE 
POTENTIAL INVESTMENT? 
 
There are a variety of factors that influence how venture capital firms make their evaluation 
decisions beyond the scope of this research work. However in Norway, VC firms rely 
significantly on their personal references and take customer loyalty to the investee firm 
coupled with their own market evaluation very seriously in the due diligence process.  
With regards to the sources of valuation information to equip these VC firm to make 
meaningful choices, Norwegian venture capital firms place special importance on the 
curriculum vitae of management followed by interview with entrepreneurs. In addition, a 
relatively high proportion of Norwegian venture capital firms use the payback period and 
capitalized maintainable earning (P/E multiples) as the methods used in valuating potential 
investments. Cost-benefit analysis is seldom used as a valuation tool.  
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6.2.2 COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN THE CONTEXT OF VENTURE CAPITAL 
INVESTMENT DECISIONS IN NORWAY 
 
VC firms who used cost benefit analysis also strictly adhered to its inherent process of 
identifying the cost and benefits of the project, measuring the costs and benefits in dollars, 
considering the costs and benefits over the life of the project and finally, reaching a decision.  
The researcher also found out that the IRR was the most used investment rule when 
performing the CBA and that the determination of the discount rate was a crucial factor and 
determined more intuitively when calculating the internal rate of return and net present value. 
Most VC used the internal rate of return as a measure of the discount rate taking into 
consideration the systematic and non-systematic risk.  The researcher also found out that, the 
discount rate used in Norway according to the stage of company financing was in perfect 
alignment with related literature and the rest of the world. 
 
6.3 IMPLICATIONS 
 
Due diligence emphasizes understanding and quantifying the risk of the proposed venture to 
be funded and so in understanding due diligence, Norwegian venture capital firms pay 
particular attention to personal references, customer loyalty and their own market valuation 
which will help  improve the information flow between them and potential entrepreneurs 
leading to better investment decisions and better long term partnerships. 
While the research by Manigart et al., (2000) indicated that the VC in the U.S. and U.K. place 
a greater importance on own due diligence report than any other means for their source of 
information for potential investment, I have found out that Norwegian venture capital firms 
emphasize more on the curriculum vitae of management, and interview with entrepreneurs, 
similarly to those in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. In terms of methods used in 
evaluating potential investments, it should be noted that a relatively high proportion of 
Norwegian venture capital firms use the payback period followed by capitalized maintainable 
earnings (P/E multiples). Hasegawa (2004) maintained that many VC adopt the book value, 
and recent transaction prices in the sector as their valuation methods, the reality is that 
capitalized maintainable earnings (P/E multiples) which is considered to be commonly used in 
countries with well-developed capital markets (Manigart at al., 2000) is also widely adopted 
  61 
by Norwegian venture capital firms. Considering the study of Hasegawa’s (2004), I may say 
that Norwegian venture capital firms have come to attach a greater importance to capitalized 
maintainable earnings (P/E multiples) in evaluating potential investments next after the 
payback period in recent years just as those in the U.S. and U.K. 
The venture capitalist aims to earn a good return on capital invested and accomplishing this 
goal entails weighing the costs and benefits of potential investment before doing cost-benefit 
analysis. CBA sorts those economic impacts into costs and benefits, and, where possible and 
worthwhile, quantifies them using statistical techniques and economic analysis. While doing a 
CBA does require time and effort, the information gained from a good quality CBA can 
provide significant pay-backs by improving the quality of returns to the venture capitalist and 
increases the confidence of the entrepreneur in the investment decision process. 
CBA is particularly useful when considering costly investment projects like initial startup 
fund undertaken by venture capitalist which is mostly associated by inherent risk of potential 
loss of the capital invested. As a result, scarce financial resources should be effectively 
allocated to produce the best return on capital invested which is the ultimate goal of most 
venture capitalist. Venture firms that have the mandate of conducting cost-benefit analysis 
prior to funding are also better able to make informed financial decisions and minimize the 
potential risk of loss. Doing cost-benefit analysis from the beginning helps the venture 
capitalist in ruling out unsuitable options before time and effort have been expended on 
converting them from ideas to polished options. Thus, it will usually be worthwhile to 
integrate cost-benefit analysis into the investment decision process from the earliest possible 
stages rather than leaving it as an “add-on” at the end.  
 
6.4 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The study has multiple implications for academics and practitioners. Firstly, for academics, 
the study provides in-depth insight into cost-benefit analysis in the context of venture capital 
investment decisions in Norway. The study highlights many areas of the process which still 
need to be researched by academics. Some areas of potential research are as follows: 
First, because the number of VC firms involved in this study is small, the model needs to be 
validated further on a larger sample through a structured mail questionnaire and telephone 
interview. Second, this study was developed to cover all types of VCs and as it is known, not 
all VCs are the same, so the differences between various VCs need to be explored. 
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Nonetheless, our study follows only Norwegian VC funds and Bygrave and Timmons (1992) 
point out that the nature of the industry varies from country to country.  
Another interesting research area will be doing a cost-benefit analysis for the entrepreneur. 
Much of the same data that has been used in this analysis can be used to find out how 
entrepreneurs stand to gain by conducting a cost-benefit analysis before approaching a 
particular venture capitalist for funding. 
Other questions worth investigating are: to what extent could the cost-benefit analysis process 
be used as a competitive tool in the venture capital industry? How important is a cost-benefit 
analysis to investment committees and supervisory boards in the venture capital decision-
making process? How do newly created and more mature venture capital firms differ in their 
investment processes with and without cost-benefit analysis? 
For practitioners, the study may be useful for that venture capitalist that does not use cost-
benefit analysis in evaluating their decisions in Norway.  Firstly, for such VCs, while doing a 
CBA does require time and effort, the information gained from a good quality CBA can 
provide significant pay-backs by improving the quality of returns to the venture capitalist and 
by increasing the confidence of the entrepreneur in the investment decision process. For more 
mature venture capital firms, the analysis may serve as the blueprint for formalizing their 
investment process.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE 1 
 
Please select as many options as possible that is peculiar to your firm 
 
1. Do you go through the benefit- cost analysis  process of  identifying the cost and benefits of 
the investment, measuring the costs and benefits in dollars, considering the costs and benefits 
over the life of the investment and finally deciding on a decision?.  
 
a) Yes                 b) No                c) Sometimes                 d) Never     e) Other 
 
2. What discount rate depending on the company stage of development do you use? 
 
………………………………………………………………………………………  
 
3. What is the time limit of exit for your company?  
 
a) 4         b) 5         c) 6           d) 7          e) 8      f) other 
 
4. Which type of risk do you consider when deciding the discount rate to use?  
 
a)  Systematic risk                 b) Non-systematic risk           c) Both            d) None        e) 
Other 
 
5. Which phase in the company development stage do you invest in? 
 
a) Start-up stage                   b) Second stage             c) Mezzanine                       d) Growth 
stage 
 
6. What are the likely benefits derived by your company for every investment undertaken? 
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 a) Return on capital invested                b) Risk diversification               c) Control of 
ownership right   d) Other 
 
7. What are the likely costs incurred by your company for every investment undertaken? 
 
a) Initial Cost of fund invested         b) Conflict of interest with entrepreneur   c) Risk of loss 
of the capital invested                     d) Other 
 
8. Which investment rule do you use to measure each investment decision when conducting 
cost benefit analysis? 
 
a) Net present Value               b) Internal rate of return                 c) Benefit- cost ratio                         
 
9. List some indirect cost incurred for every investment decision. 
……………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………… 
See 
S…………………………………………………………………………     
………………………………………………………………………. 
 
 
10 List some indirect benefits derived for every investment decision 
……………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………… 
………………………………………………………………………. 
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QUESTIONNAIRE 2 
 
1. How important are the influence of the following due diligence sources in evaluating 
potential investment? 
 
 
N0 SOURCES 5* 4 3 2 1 
1 Hire experts to review specific parts of 
business plan 
     
2 Enquire from largest and critical suppliers of 
firms credibility 
     
3 Enquire about customers loyalty      
4 Depend on associations to know data on the 
market, its size and its growth rate 
     
5 Own market evaluation      
6 Independent accounting & audit report      
7 Never use the same reporting accountant as 
management’s accounting advisors 
     
8 Great reliance on personal references      
* Score 5: Very important, score 4: Important, score 3: Moderately important, score 2: 
Slightly important, Score 1: Least important. 
 
 
2. How important are the influence of the following sources of information in evaluating 
potential investment? 
 
 SOURCES *(5) (4) (3) (2) (1) 
1 Curriculum vitae of management      
2 interview with entrepreneurs      
3 production capacity/technical information      
4 own due diligence report      
5 due diligence by accounting/consulting firms      
6 Business plan (overall consistency of plan)      
7 Business plan (more than 1 year ahead)      
8 interview with other firm personnel      
9 sales and marketing information      
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* Score 5: Very important, score 4: Important, score 3: Moderately important, score 2: 
Slightly important, Score 1: Least important. 
 
3. What methods do you use to value potential investments? 
 
 METHODS *(5) (4) (3) (2) (1) 
1 CBA 
     
2 DCF 
     
3 P/E 
MULTIPLES 
     
4 EBIT 
MULTIPLES 
     
5 PAYBACK 
PERIOD 
     
6 DIVIDEND 
YIELD BASIS 
     
7 SENSITIVITY 
ANALYSIS 
     
* Score 5: Always use, score 4: Usually, score 3: Sometimes, score 2: Seldom, score 1: Never 
use. 
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APPENDIX B 
 
GLOSSARY OF SELECTED VENTURE CAPITAL TERMS 
 
Buyout: Refers to a financing used to buy a controlling interest in a company from the prior 
owners. A buyout is often accomplished through use of a combination of borrowed capital 
and private equity, in which case it may be called a leveraged buyout (LBO) if the borrowed 
funds exceed the new capital invested. If the managers of the business are buying it, it is 
called a management buyout (MBO). 
 
Cash flow: Cash receipts from all sources less cash expenditures over a designated period of 
time, usually a month or a year. Cash flow positive means receipts exceed expenditures. Cash 
flow negative means expenditures outpace receipts. 
 
Early stage: Generally refers to a business that has passed the start-up phase and is beginning 
to generate revenue. When referring to financing, it usually includes funding rounds through 
and including first round financing. 
 
First round: A financing round for companies that have passed the start-up phase, have 
developed a marketable product or service, and are ready to ramp-up to begin to generate 
revenues. Usually follows friends and family round, a seed stage round, or both. 
 
Internal rate of return (IRR): A measure of the return on an investment taking into account 
the time between the investment and the return, and usually expressed as the percentage 
returned per year. Internal rate of return is calculated as the rate of return on an investment 
that would make the present value at the time of investment equal to all future returns on that 
investment. 
 
Mezzanine investment: An investment made later in the growth cycle of a company, usually 
after the initial venture capital rounds and in anticipation of, an initial public offering or 
merger. It is sometimes considered to be within the broad definition of venture capital. 
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Seed capital: Money invested in the earliest stages of a business, typically used for research 
and proof-of-concept of a product or service, as well as for assembling a business plan needed 
to seek later financing rounds. 
 
Seed stage: The earliest stages of a new business, in which the entrepreneur develops and 
proves a concept for a product or service and determines whether it might support a 
successful business. 
 
Start-up: A business that is at, or close to, its beginning. 
 
Lead investor – Each round of Venture Capital has a lead investor who negotiates the terms 
of the deal and usually commits to at least 50% of the round. 
 
Fund size – The total amount of capital committed by the investors of a venture capital fund. 
 
Carried interest – The portion of any gains realized by a Venture Capital Fund to which the 
fund managers are entitled, generally without having to contribute capital to the fund. Carried 
interest payments are customary in the venture capital industry to create a significant 
economic incentive for venture capital fund managers to achieve capital gains 
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APPENDIX C 
N0 SOURCES MEAN STD VAR SUM MIN MAX RAN
GE 
CORR 
1 Curriculum vitae of 
management 
3 5.66 32 15 0 13 13 0.198 
2 Interview with 
entrepreneurs 
3 4.06 16.5 15 0 10 10 -0.550 
3 Production 
capacity/technical 
information 
3 1.41 2 15 1 4 3 -0.593 
4 Own due diligence report 3 2.35 5.5 15 1 7 6 -0.477 
5 Due diligence by 
accounting firms 
3 2.35 5.5 15 1 6 5 0.238 
6 Business plan (overall 
consistency of plan) 
3 3.39 11.5 15 0 8 8 0.577 
7 Business plan (more than 
1 year ahead) 
3 2.24 5 15 0 6 6 0.125 
8 Interview with other firm 
personnel 
3 2.24 5 15 0 6 6 0.12 
9 Sales and marketing 
information 
3 1.41 2 15 1 4 3 -0.982 
 CBA 3 4.47 20 15 0 10 10  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 13: Correlation between the Sources of Information in Evaluating Potential Investments 
and Cost-benefit Analysis 
